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ifty  years  ago,  the  Elysée  Treaty  created  a  framework  for  structured  cooperation 
between France and Germany, which has served both countries well and has often 
constituted an indispensable motor for European integration. Any political innovation 
that endures for half a century must have a sound basis.  
What was this basis? It must have been mainly political since the importance of the bilateral 
economic relations should not be overestimated: both were usually the biggest trade partner 
of the other, but Germany took only 10% of French exports fifty years ago. After some ups 
and downs, however, this is about same percentage today. France was usually the largest 
export  market  for  Germany,  but here  again  this  was  relative:  in  1963,  only  about  7%  of 
German exports went to France. This percentage increased to almost 12% during the 1970s, 
but has since fallen back to somewhat below the 1963 value. The rest of the world has thus 
become more important for Germany recently, but the relative importance of France as a 
trading partner is today about the same as it was half a century ago. This relative stability of 
the bilateral trade shares is actually a testament to the integration that has taken place in 
Europe because both Europe and the world outside Europe have grown so much. As the 
world economy grows, one would expect bilateral trade to become less important. But this 
has not been the case, at least so far. 
Figure 1. Bilateral trade as share of total trade 
 
Sources: IMF, Ameco, Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis). 
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In absolute terms, bilateral relations have actually become more important since in 1963 both 
economies  were  much  less  open.  The  7%  of  total  German  exports  going  to  France  then 
amounted to only less than 1.5% of German GDP, but the 6.5% of total German exports going 
to France today amount to close to 3% of German GDP. In this sense, bilateral trade has 
almost doubled in importance.  
In  the  long  run  it  appears  that  French  citizens  drew  more  advantages  from  economic 
integration  over  this  period.  In  1963  GDP  per  capita  at  PPP  was  about  30%  higher  in 
Germany,  but  the  distance  narrowed  over  the  next  ten  years.  Unification  brought  great 
changes (Germany’s GDP per capita initially fell) allowing France to actually achieve, for a 
fleeting moment, parity with Germany in terms of GDP per capita. But over the last years 
Germany’s income per has been growing faster reaching again 115% of the French level, not 
far from the relative value of 1963.  
Unification also brought many short-term changes in terms of the overall size of the two 
economies. But in the end there has been even less change. In 1963 Germany’s GDP was 
about 20% larger that of France; today the difference in size is not much greater although the 
German population has increased by about one-quarter as a result of unification. Stronger 
French growth  (on  average  over  the  last  half  century) has  offset much  of  that.  Over the 
longer term, the relative size of the French economy might actually increase again as the 
French  population  keeps  growing  whereas  that  of  Germany  will  stagnate  at  best  if 
immigration offsets the natural population decline due to a record-low birth rate. On this 
count the two economies should thus remain of comparable size. 
 
Figure 2. Ratio of Germany/France for nominal GDP 
 
Source: European Commission. 
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Figure 3. Ratio of Germany/France for real GDP per capita 
 
Source: European Commission. 
 
There is one area, however, where the relative weight of these two countries has moved 
greatly over time, namely their performance in global markets. Fifty years ago, Germany’s 
exports used to be about 30% higher than those of France; they are 90% higher today. 
 
Figure 4. Ratio of German exports over French exports 
 
Source: European Commission. 
 
What has not changed much is that in every major global economic crisis there is pressure on 
Germany to reflate and stop running current account surpluses. This was already the case 50 
years  ago  and  remains  true  today.  Although  the  importance  of  Germany  in  the  global 
economy is much smaller now, its current account surplus is still the largest in the world, 
somewhat larger even than that of China and double that of Japan. However, the German 
current account is much less important on its own today because it has been ‘fused’ inside 
the euro area with the deficit of France so that the global political pressure on Germany to 
reflate is much reduced. 
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The Franco-German alliance was not founded on economic grounds given that the bilateral 
economic ties were of marginal importance to both. However, it presupposes that the two 
partners are of comparable economic strength. In terms of the overall domestic size of the 
two  economies,  the  relative  weights have  not  changed  much  over  time,  but  the  external 
differences have grown and must now be managed carefully within the euro area. 
The enduring key role of the two countries in Europe no longer depends on their dominant 
size. In 1963, the economies of France and Germany accounted for almost two-thirds of the 
six founding members of the European Union. Today the two together account for little over 
one-third of the EU27. They cannot dominate, but they can perform a central role, especially 
if they disagree on a key issue. Each side can then usually represent the point of view of a 
group of other member states. If France and Germany can then find a useful compromise, the 
other countries will accept this compromise as well. This is why ‘Merkozy’ could not work. 
When  France  automatically  takes  the  same  position  as  Germany,  many  other  member 
countries will feel that their interests are being neglected. 
At present again, France represents the interests of a group of countries that are asking for 
more solidarity, whereas Germany represents not only its own interests, but also the point of 
view of other countries that are asking for adjustment. A Franco-German compromise will 
thus again be able to represent a central point of reference for an agreement that can be 
accepted by everybody. 
Will the Elysée Treaty be useful for another 50 years?  
The two countries used to be important global economies, each in its own right. Today their 
economies produce only 2.4% in the case of France and 3.4% in the case of Germany of global 
GDP  at  PPP,  with  the  trend  pointing  towards  further  decline.  They  are  on  the  way  to 
becoming irrelevant at the global scale and confront an immense new challenge. The two 
countries must now abandon the pretence of performing an independent role at the global 
scale and accept the inevitable: To accept that European institutions represent Europe as a 
whole on the global scene. This concerns the realm of economics as well as politics. So far the 
two  countries  have  conspired  to  block  meaningful  progress  in  both  areas.  There  is  no 
representation of the euro area at the IMF and the uncoordinated way in which France and 
Germany stumbled into the civil war in Mali does not bode well for the European External 
Action Service becoming an effective common institution.  
It is appropriate to celebrate a bilateral relationship that has been so beneficial for Europe as 
well. But the challenge for the future is to turn their eyes outward and recognise that the 
points of view of France and Germany will matter only if they accept to pool even more 
sovereignty in Europe. 